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1. Introduction
Compaired to other physical theories, the foundation of quantum mechanics is very formal
and abstract. The pure state of a system is defined as a complex vector (or ray) in some
abstract vector space, the observables as Hermitian operators on this space. Even a modern
textbook like Ballentine [1] starts by introducing two abstract postulates:
1. To each dynamical variable there corresponds a linear operator, and the possible values
of the dynamical variable are the eigenvalues of the operator.
2. To each state there corresponds a unique operator ρ. The average value of a dynamical
variable R, represented by the operator R, in the state given by the operator ρ is given by
〈R〉 =
Tr(ρR)
Tr(ρ)
. (1)
Here Tr is the trace operator. The discussion in [1] goes on by arguing that R must be
Hermitian (have real eigenvalues) and that ρ ought to be positive with trace 1. An important
special case is when ρ is one-dimensional: ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| for a vector |ψ〉. Then the state is pure,
and is equivalently specified by the vector |ψ〉. In general the formula (1) is a consequence of
Born’s formula: The probability of observing a pure state |φ〉 when the system is prepared
in a pure state |ψ〉 is given by |〈φ|ψ〉|2.
From these two postulates a very rich theory is deduced, a theory which has proved to be in
agreement with observations in each case where it has been tested. Still, the abstract nature
of the basic postulates leaves one a little uneasy: Is it possible to find another basis which is
more directly connected to what one observes in nature? The purpose of this chapter is to
show that to a large extent one can give a positive answer to this question.
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Another problem is that there are many interpretations of quantum mechanics. In this
chapter I will choose an epistemic interpretation: Quantum mechanics is related to the
knowledge we get about nature, not directly to how nature ’is’. The latter aspect - the
ontological aspect of nature - is something we can talk about when all observers agree on the
same information. Any knowledge about nature is found through an epistemic process - an
experiment or an observational study. Typically we ask a question: What is θ? And after the
epistemic process is completed, nature gives an answer, in the simplest case: θ = uk, where
uk is one of several possible values. Here θ is what we will call an epistemic conceptual variable
or e-variable, a variable defined by an observer or by a group of observers and defining the
epistemic process.
In all empirical sciences, epistemic questions like this are posed to nature. It is well known
that the answers are not always that simple. Typically we end up with a confidence interval
(a frequentist concept) or a credibility interval (a Bayesian concept) for θ. This leads us into
statistical science. In statistics, θ is most often called a parameter, and is often connected to
a population of experimental units. But there are instances also in statistics where we want
to predict a value for a single unit. The corresponding intervals are then called prediction
intervals. In this chapter we will also use θ for an unknown variable for a single unit, which
is a situation very often met in physics. This is the generalization we think about when we
in general call θ an e-variable, not a parameter. Also, the notion of a parameter may have a
different meaning in physics, so by this we will avoid confusion.
A more detailed discussion than what can be covered here, can be found in Helland [2].
2. A basis for statistics
Every experiment or observational study is made in a context. Part of the context may
be physical, another part may be historical, including earlier experiments. Also, the status
of the observer(s) may be seen as a part of the context, and another part of the context
may be conceptual, including a goal for the study. In all our discussion, we assume that
we have conditioned upon the context τ. We can imagine the context formulated as a set
of propositions. But propositional calculus corresponds to set theory, as both are Boolean
algebras. Therefore we can here in principle use the familiar concept of conditioning as
developed in Kolmogorov’s theory of probability, where it is defined as a Radon-Nikodym
derivative. Readers unfamiliar to this mathematics may think of a more intuitive conditioning
concept.
In addition, for every experiment, we have an e-variable of interest θ and we have data z.
A basis for all statistical theory is the statistical model, the distribution of z as a function
of θ. Conceptual variables which are not of interest, may be taken as part of the context τ.
The density of the statistical model, seen as a function of θ, is called the likelihood. We will
assume throughout:
1) The distribution of z, given τ, depends on an unknown e-variable θ.
2) If τ or part of τ has a distribution, this is independent of θ. The part of τ which does not
have a distribution is functionally independent of θ.
A function of the data is called a statistic t(z). Often it is of interest to reduce the data to a
sufficient statistic, a concept due to R. A. Fisher.
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Definition 1.
We say that t = t(z) is a τ-sufficient for θ if the conditional distribution of z, given t, τ and θ is
independent of θ.
The intuitive notion here is that if the distribution of z, given t is independent of θ, the
distribution of the whole data set might as well be generated by the distribution of t, given
θ together with some random mechanism which is totally independent of the conceptual
variable of interest. This is the basis for
The sufficiency principle.
Consider an experiment in a context τ, let z be the data of this experiment, and let θ be the e-variable
of interest. Let t = t(z) be a τ-sufficient statistic for θ. Then, if t(z1) = t(z2), the data z1 and z2
contain the same experimental evidence about θ in the context τ.
Here ’experimental evidence’ is left undefined. The principle is regarded as intuitively
obvious by most statisticians.
Another principle which is concidered intuitively obvious by most statisticians, is
The conditionality principle 1.
Suppose that there are two experiments E1 and E2 with common conceptual variable of interest θ and
with equivalent contexts τ. Consider a mixed experiment E∗, whereby u = 1 or u = 2 is observed,
each having probability 1/2 (independent of θ, the data of the experiments and the contexts), and the
experiment Eu is then performed. Then the evidence about θ from E
∗ is just the evidence from the
experiment actually performed.
Two contexts τ and τ′ are defined to be equivalent if there is a one-to-one correspondence
between them: τ′ = f (τ); τ = f−1(τ′). The principle can be motivated by simple examples.
From these examples one can also deduce
The conditionality principle 2.
In the situation of conditionality principle 1 one should in any statistical analysis condition upon the
outcome of the coin toss.
It caused much discussion among statisticians when Birnbaum [3] proved that the sufficiency
principle and the conditionality principle 1 together imply
The likelihood principle.
Consider two experiments with equivalent contexts τ, and assume that θ is the same full e-variable
in both experiments. Suppose that the two observations z∗1 and z
∗
2 have proportional likelihoods in the
two experiments. Then these two observations produce the same evidence on θ in this context.
It is crucial for the present chapter that these principles may be generalized from experiments
to any epistemic processes involving data such that 1) and 2) are satisfied.
An important special case of the likelihood principle is when E1 and E2 are the same
experiment and z∗1 and z
∗
2 have equal likelihoods. Then the likelihood principle says that
any experimental evidence on θ must only depend on the likelihood (given the context).
Without taking the context into account this is really controversial. It seems like common
statistical methods like confidence intervals and test of hypotheses are excluded. But this is
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saved when we can take confidence levels, alternative hypotheses, test levels etc. as part of
the context.
A discussion of these common statistical methods will not be included here; the reader is
referred to [2] for this. Also, a discussion of the important topic of model reduction in
statistics will be omitted here. Sometimes a statistical model contains more structure than
what has been assumed here; for instance group actions may be defined on the space of
e-variables. Then any model reduction should be to an orbit or to a set of orbits for the
group; for examples, see [2].
3. Inaccessible conceptual variables and quantum theory
An e-variable as it is used here is related to the question posed in an epistemic process:
What is the value of θ? Sometimes we can obtain an accurate answer to such a question,
sometimes not. We call θ accessible if we in principle can devise an experiment such that θ
can be assessed with arbitrary accuracy. If this in principle is impossible, we say that θ is
inaccessible.
Consider a single medical patient which at time t = 0 can be given one out of two mutually
exclusive treatments A or B. The time θA until recovery given treatment A can be measured
accurately by giving this treatment and waiting a sufficiently long time, likewise the time θB
until recovery given treatment B. But consider the vector φ = (θA, θB). This vector can not
be assessed with arbitrary accuracy by any person neither before, during nor after treatment.
The vector φ is inaccessible. A similar phenomenon occurs in all counterfactual situations.
Many more situations with inaccessible conceptual variables can be devised. Consider a
fragile apparatus which is destroyed after a single measurement of some quantity θ1, and
let θ2 be another quantity which can only be measured by dismantling the apparatus. Then
φ = (θ1, θ2) is inaccessible. Or consider two sensitive questions to be posed to a single person
at some moment of time, where we expect that the order in which the questions are posed
may be relevant for the answers. Let (θ1, θ2) be the answers when the questions are posed in
one order, and let (θ3, θ4) be the answers when the questions are posed in the opposite order.
Then the vector φ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4) is inaccessible.
I will approach quantum mechanics by looking upon it as an epistemic science and pointing
out the different inaccessible conceptual variables. First, by Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle, the vector (ξ,pi) is inaccessible, where ξ is the theoretical position and pi is the
theoretical momentum of a particle. This implies that (ξ(t1), ξ(t2)), the positions at two
different times, is an inaccessible vector. Hence the trajectory of the particle is inaccessible.
In the two-slit experiment (α, θ) is inaccessible, where α denotes the slit that the particle goes
through, and θ is the phase of the particle’s wave as it hits the screen.
In this chapter I will pay particular attention to a particle’s spin/ angular momentum.
The spin or angular momentum vector is inaccessible, but its component λa in any chosen
direction a will be accessible.
It will be crucial for my discussion that even though a vector is inaccessible, it can be seen
upon as an abstract quantity taking values in some space and one can often act on it by group
actions. Thus in the medical example which started this section, a change of time units will
affect the whole vector φ, and a spin vector can be acted upon by rotations.
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4. The maximal symmetrical epistemic setting
A general setting will be descibed, and then I will show that spin and angular momentum
are special cases of this setting. This is called the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting.
Consider an inaccessible conceptual variable φ, and let there be accessible e-variables λa(φ)
(a ∈ A) indexed by some set A. Thus for each a, one can ask the question: What is the value
of λa? and get some information from experiment. To begin with, assume that these are
maximally accessible, more precisely maximal in the ordering where α < β when α = f (β)
for some f . This can be assumed by Zorn’s lemma, but it will later be relaxed. For a 6= b let
there be an invertible transformation gab such that λ
b(φ) = λa(gab(φ)).
In general, let a group H act on a conceptual variable φ. A function η(φ) is said to be
permissible with respect to H if η(φ1) = η(φ2) implies η(hφ1) = η(hφ2) for all h ∈ H. Then
one can define a corresponding group H˜ acting upon η. For a given function η(φ) there is a
maximal group with respect to which it is permissible.
Now fix 0 ∈ A and let G0 be the maximal group under which λ0(φ) is permissible. Take
Ga = ga0G
0g0a, and let G be the smallest group containing G
0 and all the transformations
ga0. It is then easy to see that G
a is the maximal group under which λa(φ) is permissible, and
that G is the group generated by Ga; a ∈ A and the transformations gab. Make the following
assumptions about G:
a) It is a locally compact topological group satisfying weak conditions such that an invariant
measure ρ exists on the space Φ of φ’s.
b) λa(φ) varies over an orbit or a set of orbits of the smaller group Ga. More precisely: λa
varies over an orbit or a set of orbits of the corresponding group G˜a on its range.
c) G is generated by the product of elements of Ga,Gb, ...; a, b, ... ∈ A.
As an important example, let φ be the spin vector or the angular momentum vector for a
particle or a system of particles. Let G be the group of rotations of the vector φ, that is, the
group which fixes the norm ‖φ‖. Next, choose a direction a i space, and focus upon the
spin component in this direction: ζa = ‖φ‖cos(φ, a). The largest subgroup Ga with respect
to which ζa(φ) is permissible, is given by rotations around a together with a reflection in a
plane pependicular to a. However, the action of the corresponding group G˜a on ζa is just a
reflection together with the identity.
Finally introduce model reduction. As mentioned at the end of the previous section, such a
model reduction for ζa should be to an orbit or to a set of orbits for the group G˜a as acting on
ζa. These orbits are given as two-point sets ±c together with the single point 0. To conform
to the ordinary theory of spin/angular momentum, I will choose the set of orbits indexed by
an integer or half-integer j and let the reduced set of orbits be −j,−j + 1, ..., j− 1, j. Letting
λa be the e-variable ζa reduced to this set of orbits of G˜a, and assuming it to be a maximally
accessible e-variable, we can prove the general assumptions of the maximal symmetrical
epistemic setting (except for the case j = 0, where we must redefine G to be the trivial
group). For instance, here is an indication of the proof leading to assumption c) above: given
a and b, a transformation gab sending λa(φ) onto λb(φ) can be obtained by a reflection in a
plane orthogonal to the two vectors a and b, a plane containing the midline between a and b.
The case with one orbit and c = j = 1/2 corresponds to electrons and other spin 1/2 particles.
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In general, assumption b) in the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting may be motivated in
a similar manner: First, a conceptual variable ζa is introduced for each a through a chosen
focusing, then define Ga as the maximal group under which ζa(φ) is permissible, with G˜a
being the corresponding group acting on ζa. Finally define λa as the reduction of ζa to a
set of orbits of G˜a. The content of assumption b) is that it is this λa which is maximally
accessible. This may be regarded as the quantum hypothesis.
5. Hilbert space, pure states and operators
Consider the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting. The crucial step towards the formalism
of quantum mechanics is to define a Hilbert space, that is, a complete inner product space
which can serve as a state space for the system.
By assumption a) there exists an invariant measure ρ for the group’s action: ρ(gA) = ρ(A)
for all g ∈ G and all Borel-measurable subsets A of the space Φ of inaccessible conceptual
variables. If G is transitive on Φ, then ρ is unique up to a multiplicative constant. For compact
groups ρ can be normalized, i.e., taken as a probability measure. For each a define
Ha = { f ∈ L2(Φ, ρ) : f (φ) = r(λa(φ)) for some function r.}
Thus Ha is the set of L2-functions that are functions of λa(φ). Since Ha is a closed subspace
of the Hilbert space L2(Φ, ρ), it is itself a Hilbert space. To define our state space H, we now
fix an arbitrary index a = 0 ∈ A, and take
H = H0.
First look at the case where the accessible e-variables take a finite, discrete set of values. Let
{uk} be the set of possible values of λ
a. Since λa(·) is maximal, {uk} can be taken to be
independent of a, see [2]. Now go back to the definition of an epistemic process: We start by
choosing a, that is, ask an epistemic question: What is the value of λa? After the process we
get some information; I will here look upon the simple case where we get full knowledge:
λa = uk. I define this as a pure state of the system; it can be characterized by the indicator
function 1(λa(φ) = uk). This is a function in H
a, but I will show below that one can find an
invertible operator Va such that
f ak (φ) = V
a1(λa(φ) = uk) (2)
is a unique function in H = H0. Since H in this case is a K-dimensional vector space, where
K is the number of values uk, we can regard f
a
k as a K-dimensional vector. To conform to the
ordinary quantum mechanical notation, I write this as a ket-vector |a; k〉 = f ak . It is easy to
see that {|0; k〉; k = 1, ...,K} is an orthonormal basis of H when ρ is normalized to be 1 for the
whole space Φ. I will show below that {|a; k〉; k = 1, ...,K} has the same property. My main
point is that |a; k〉 is characterized by and characterizes a question: What is λa? together with
an answer: λa = uk. This is a pure state for the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting.
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I will also introduce operators by
Aa =
K
∑
k=1
uk|a; k〉〈a; k|,
where 〈a; k| is the bra vector corresponding to |a; k〉. This is by definition the observator
corresponding to the e-variable λa. Since λa is maximal, Aa will have non-degenerate
eigenvalues uk. Knowing A
a, we will have information of all possible values of λa together
with information about all possible states connected to this variable.
The rest of this section will be devoted to proving (2) and showing the properties of the
state vectors |a; k〉. To allow for future generalizations I now allow the accessible e-variables
λa to take any set of values, continuous or discrete. The discussion will by necessity be
a bit technical. First I define the (left) regular representation U for a group G. For given
f ∈ L2(Φ, ρ) and given g ∈ G we define a new function U(g) f by
U(g) f (φ) = f (g−1φ). (3)
Without proof I mention 5 properties of the set of operators U(g):
• U(g) is linear: U(g)(a1 f1 + a2 f2) = a1U(g) f1 + a2U(g) f2.
• U(g) is unitary: 〈U(g) f1, f2〉 = 〈 f1,U(g)
−1 f2〉 in L
2(Φ, ρ).
• U(g) is bounded: sup f :‖ f ‖=1‖U(g) f ‖ = 1 < ∞.
• U(·) is continuous: If lim gn = g0 in the group topology, then lim U(gn) = U(g0) (in the
matrix norm in the finite-dimensional case, which is what I will focus on here, in general
in the topology of bounded linear operators).
• U(·) is a homomorphism: U(g1g2) = U(g1)U(g2) for all g1, g2 and U(e) = I for the unit
element.
The concept of homomorphism will be crucial in this section. In general, a homomorphism
is a mapping k → k′ between groups K and K′ such that k1 → k
′
1 and k2 → k
′
2 implies
k1k2 → k
′
1k
′
2 and such that e → e
′ for the identities. Then also k−1 → (k′)−1 when k → k′.
A representation of a group K is a continuous homomorphism from K into a group of invertible
operators on some vector space. If the vector space is finite dimensional, the linear operators
can be taken as matrices. There is a large and useful mathematical theory about operator
(matrix) representations of groups; some of it is sketched in Appendix 3 of [2]. Equation (3)
gives one such representation of the basic group G on the vector space L2(Φ, ρ).
Proposition 1.
Let Ua = U(g0a) with gab defined in the beginning of Section 4. Then
Ha = U−1a H through r(λ
a(φ)) = U−1a r(λ
0(φ)).
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Proof. If f ∈ Ha, then f (φ) = r(λa(φ)) = r(λ0(g0aφ)) = U(g0a)
−1r(λ0(φ)) = U−1a f0(φ),
where f0 ∈ H = H
0.
Since a = 0 is a fixed but arbitrary index, this gives in principle a unitary connection between
the different choices of H, different representations of the ’Hilbert space apparatus’. However
this connection cannot be used directly in (2), since if f ak = 1(λ
a = uk) is the state function
representing the question: What is λa? together with the answer λa = uk, then we have
Ua f
a
k = U(g0a)1(λ
0(g0aφ) = uk) = U(g0a)U(g0a)
−1
1(λ0(φ) = uk) = f
0
k .
Thus by this simple transformation the indicator functions in H are not able to distinguish
between the different questions asked.
Another reason why the simple solution is not satisfactory is that the regular representation
U will not typically be a representation of the whole group G on the Hilbert space H. This
can however be amended by the following theorem. Its proof and the resulting discussion
below are where the Assumption c) of the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting is used.
Recall that throughout, upper indices (Ga, ga) are for the subgroups of G connected to the
accessible variables λa, similarly (G˜a, g˜a) for the group (elements) acting upon λa. Lower
indices (e.g., Ua = U(g0a)) are related to the transformations between these variables.
Theorem 1.
(i) A representation (possibly multivalued) V of the whole group G on H can always be found.
(ii) For ga ∈ Ga we have V(ga) = UaU(ga)U†a .
Proof. (i) For each a and for ga ∈ Ga define V(ga) = U(g0a)U(g
a)U(ga0). Then V(g
a) is an
operator on H = H0, since it is equal to U(g0ag
aga0), and g0ag
aga0 ∈ G
0 by the construction of
Ga from G0. For a product gagbgc with ga ∈ Ga, gb ∈ Gb and gc ∈ Gc we define V(gagbgc) =
V(ga)V(gb)V(gc), and similarly for all elements of G that can be written as a finite product
of elements from different subgroups.
Let now g and h be any two elements in G such that g can be written as a product of
elements from Ga,Gb and Gc, and similarly h (the proof is similar for other cases.) It follows
that V(gh) = V(g)V(h) on these elements, since the last factor of g and the first factor of h
either must belong to the same subgroup or to different subgroups; in both cases the product
can be reduced by the definition of the previous paragraph. In this way we see that V is a
representation on the set of finite products, and since these generate G by Assumption c),
and since U, hence by definition V, is continuous, it is a representation of G.
Since different representations of g as a product may give different solutions, we have to
include the possibility that V may be multivalued.
(ii) Directly from the proof of (i).
What is meant by a multivalued representation? As an example, consider the group SU(2) of
unitary 2× 2 matrices. Many books in group theory will state that there is a homomorphism
from SU(2) to the group SO(3) of real 3-dimensional rotations, where the kernel of the
homomorphism is ±I. This latter statement means that both +I and −I are mapped into the
identity rotation by the homomorphism.
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In this case there is no unique inverse SO(3) → SU(2), but nevertheless we may say
informally that there is a multivalued homomorphism from SO(3) to SU(2). Here is a way
to make this precise:
Extend SU(2) to a new group with elements (g, k), where g ∈ SU(2) and k is an element
of the group K = {±1} with the natural multiplication. The multiplication in this extended
group is defined by (g1, k1) · (g2, k2) = (g1g2, k1k2), and the inverse by (g, k)
−1 = (g−1, k−1).
Then there is an invertible homomorphism between this extended group and SO(3).
A similar construction can be made with the representation V of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2.
(i) There is an extended group G′ such that V is a univariate representation of G′ on H.
(ii) There is a unique mapping G′ → G, denoted by g′ → g, such that V(g′) = V(g). This mapping
is a homomorphism.
Proof. (i) Assume as in Theorem 1 that we have a multivalued representation V of G. Define
a larger group G′ as follows: If gagbgc = gdgeg f , say, with gk ∈ Gk for all k, we define
g′1 = g
agbgc and g′2 = g
dgeg f . A similar definition of new group elements is done if we
have equality of a limit of such products. Let G′ be the collection of all such new elements
that can be written as a formal product of elements gk ∈ Gk or as limits of such symbols.
The product is defined in the natural way, and the inverse by for example (gagbgc)−1 =
(gc)−1(gb)−1(ga)−1. By Assumption 2c), the group G′ generated by this construction must
be at least as large as G. It is clear from the proof of Theorem 1 that V also is a representation
of the larger group G′ on H, now a one-valued representation.
(ii) Again, if gagbgc = gdgeg f = g, say, with gk ∈ Gk for all k, we define g′1 = g
agbgc and
g′2 = g
dgeg f . There is a natural map g′1 → g and g
′
2 → g, and the situation is similar for other
products and limits of products. It is easily shown that this mapping is a homomorphism.
Note that while G is a group of transformations on Φ, the extended group G′ must be
considered as an abstract group.
Theorem 3.
(i) For g′ ∈ G′ there is a unique g0 ∈ G0 such that V(g′) = U(g0). The mapping g′ → g0 is a
homomorphism.
(ii) If g′ → g0 by the homomorphism of (i), and g′ 6= e′ in G′, then g0 6= e in G0.
Proof. (i) Consider the case where g′ = gagbgc with gk ∈ Gk. Then by the proof of Theorem
1:
V(g′) = UaU(g
a)U†a UbU(g
b)U†b UcU(g
c)U†c = U(g0ag
aga0g0bg
bgb0g0cg
cgc0)
= U(g0),
where g0 ∈ G0. The group element g0 is unique since the decomposition g′ = gagbgc is
unique for g′ ∈ G′. The proof is similar for other decompositions and limits of these. By the
construction, the mapping g′ → g0 is a homomorphism.
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(ii) Assume that g0 = e and g′ 6= e′. Since U(g0) f˜ (λ0(φ)) = f˜ (λ0((g0)−1(φ))), it follows
from g0 = e that U(g0) = I on H. But then from (i), V(g′) = I, and since V is a univariate
representation, it follows that g′ = e′, contrary to the assumption.
The theorems 1-3 are valid in any maximal symmetrical epistemic setting. I will now again
specialize to the case where the accessible e-variables λ have a finite discrete range. This is
often done in elementary quantum theory texts, in fact also in recent quantum foundation
papers, and in our situation it has several advantages:
• It is easy to interprete the principle that λ can be estimated with any fixed accuracy.
• In particular, confidence regions and credibility regions for an accessible e-variable can
be taken as single points if observations are accurate enough.
• The operators involved will be much simpler and are defined everywhere.
• The operators Aa can be understood directly from the epistemic setting; see above.
So look at the statement λa(φ) = uk. This means two things: 1) One has sought information
about the value of the maximally accessible e-variable λa, that is, asked the question: What is
the value of λa? 2) One has obtained the answer λa = uk. This information can be thought of
as a perfect measurement, and it can be represented by the indicator function 1(λa(φ) = uk),
which is a function in Ha. From Proposition 1, this function can by a unitary transformation
be represented in H, which now is a vector space with a discrete basis, a finite-dimensional
vector space: Ua f
a
k . However, we have seen that this tentative state definition Ua1(λ
a(φ) =
uk) = U(g0a)1(λ
0(g0aφ) = uk) led to ambiguities. These ambiguities can be removed by
replacing the two g0a’s here in effect by different elements g
′
0ai of the extended group G
′. Let
g′0a1 and g
′
0a2 be two different such elements where both g
′
0a1 → g0a and g
′
0a2 → g0a according
to Theorem 2 (ii). I will prove in a moment that this is in fact always possible when g0a 6= e.
Let g′a = (g
′
0a1)
−1g′0a2, and define
f ak (φ) = V(g
′
a)Ua1(λ
a(φ) = uk) = V(g
′
a) f
0
k (φ).
This gives the relation (2).
In order that the interpretation of f ak as a state |a; k〉 shall make sense, I need the following
result. I assume that G˜0 is non-trivial.
Theorem 4.
a) Assume that two vectors in H satisfy |a; i〉 = |b; j〉, where |a; i〉 corresponds to λa = ui for one
perfect measurement and |b; j〉 corresponds to λb = uj for another perfect measurement. Then there
is a one-to-one function F such that λb = F(λa) and uj = F(ui). On the other hand, if λ
b = F(λa)
and uj = F(ui) for such a function F, then |a; i〉 = |b; j〉.
b) Each |a; k〉 corresponds to only one {λa, uk} pair except possibly for a simultaneous one-to-one
transformation of this pair.
Proof. a) I prove the first statement; the second follows from the proof of the first statement.
Without loss of generality consider a system where each e-variable λ takes only two values,
say 0 and 1. Otherwise we can reduce to a degerate system with just these two values: The
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statement |a; i〉 = |b; j〉 involves, in addition to λa and λb, only the two values ui and uj. By
considering a function of the maximally accessible e-variable (compare the next section), we
can take one specific value equal to 1, and the others collected in 0. By doing this, we also
arrange that both ui and uj are 1, so we are comparing the state given by λ
a = 1 with the
state given by λb = 1.
By the definition, |a; 1〉 = |b; 1〉 can be written
V(g′a)Ua1(λ
a(φ) = 1) = V(g′b)Ub1(λ
b(φ) = 1)
for group elements g′a and g
′
b in G
′.
Use Theorem 3(i) and find g0a and g
0
b in G
0 such that V(g′a) = U(g
0
a) and V(g
′
b) = U(g
0
b).
Therefore
U(g0a)U(g0a)1(λ
a(φ) = 1) = U(g0b)U(g0b)1(λ
b(φ) = 1);
1(λa(φ) = 1) = U(g0)1(λb(φ) = 1) = 1(λb((g0)−1φ) = 1),
for g0 = (g0a)
−1(g0a)
−1g0b g0b.
Both λa and λb take only the values 0 and 1. Since the set where λb(φ) = 1 can
be transformed into the set where λa(φ) = 1, we must have λa = F(λb) for some
transformation F.
b) follows trivially from a).
Corollary.
The group G is properly contained in G′, so the representation V of Theorem 1 is really multivalued.
Proof. If we had G′ = G, then |a; k〉 and |b; k〉 both reduce to Ua1(λa(φ) = uk) = Ub1(λ
b(φ) =
uk) = 1(λ
0 = uk), so Theorem 4 and its proof could not be valid.
Theorem 4 and its corollary are also valid in the situation where we are interested in just
two accessible variables λa and λb, which might as well be called λ0 and λa. We can then
provisionally let the group G be generated by g0a, ga0 = g
−1
0a and all elements g
0 and ga. The
earlier statement that it is always possible to find two different elements g′0a1 and g
′
0a2 in G
′
which are mapped onto g0a follows.
Finally we have
Theorem 5.
For each a ∈ A, the vectors {|a; k〉; k = 1, 2, ...} form an orthonormal basis for H.
Proof. Taking the invariant measure ρ on H as normalized to 1, the indicator functions |0; k〉 =
1(λ0(φ) = uk) form an orthonormal basis for H. Since the mapping |0; k〉 → |a; k〉 is unitary,
the Theorem follows.
So if b 6= a and k is fixed, there are complex constants cki such that |b; k〉 = ∑i cki|a; i〉. This
opens for the interference effects that one sees discussed in quantum mechanical texts. In
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particular |a; k〉 = ∑i dki|0; i〉 for some constants dki. This is the first instance of something
that we also will meet later in different situations: New states in H are found by taking linear
combinations of a basic set of state vectors.
6. The general symmetrical epistemic setting
Go back to the definition of the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting. Let again φ be the
inaccessible conceptual variable and let λa for a ∈ A be the maximal accessible conceptual
variables, functions of φ. Let the corresponding induced groups Ga and G satisfy the
assumptions a)-c). Finally, let ta for each a be an arbitrary function on the range of λa,
and assume that we observe θa = ta(λa); a ∈ A. We will call this the symmetrical epistemic
setting; it is no longer necessarily maximal with respect to the observations θa.
Consider first the quantum states |a; k〉. We are no longer interested in the full information
on λa, but keep the Hilbert space as in Section 5, and now let hak(φ) = 1(t
a(λa) = ta(uk)) =
1(θa = uak), where u
a
k = t
a(uk). We let again g
′
0a1 and g
′
0a2 be two distinct elements of G
′ such
that g′0ai → g0a, define g
′
a = (g
′
0a1)
−1g′0a2 and then
|a; k〉 = V(g′a)Uah
a
k = V(g
′
a)|0; k〉,
where |0; k〉 = h0k .
Interpretation of the state vector |a; k〉:
1) The question: ’What is the value of θa?’ has been posed. 2) We have obtained the answer θa = uak .
Both the question and the answer are contained in the state vector.
From this we may define the operator connected to the e-variable θa:
Aa = ∑
k
uak |a; k〉〈a; k| = ∑
k
ta(uk)|a; k〉〈a; k|.
Then Aa is no longer necessarily an operator with distinct eigenvalues, but Aa is still
Hermitian: Aa† = Aa.
Interpretation of the operator Aa:
This gives all possible states and all possible values corresponding to the accessible e-variable θa.
The projectors |a; k〉〈a; k| and hence the ket vectors |a; k〉 are no longer uniquely determined
by Aa: They can be transformed arbitrarily by unitary transformations in each space
corresponding to one eigenvalue. In general I will redefine |a; k〉 by allowing it to be subject
to such transformations. These transformed eigenvectors all still correspond to the same
eigenvalue, that is, the same observed value of θa and they give the same operators Aa.
In particular, in the maximal symmetric epistemic setting I will allow an arbitrary constant
phase factor in the definition of the |a; k〉’s.
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As an example of the general construction, assume that λa is a vector: λa = (θa1 , ..., θam ).
Then one can write a state vector corresponding to λa as
|a; k〉 = |a1; k1〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |am; km〉
in an obvious notation, where a = (a1, ..., am) and k = (k1, ..., km). The different θ’s may be
connected to different subsystems.
So far I have kept the same groups Ga and G when going from λa to θa = ta(λa), that
is from the maximal symmetrical epistemic setting to the general symmetrical epistemic
setting. This implies that the (large) Hilbert space will be the same. A special case occurs
if ta is a reduction to an orbit of Ga. This is the kind of model reduction mentioned at the
end of Section 2. Then the construction of the previous sections can also be carried with a
smaller group action acting just upon an orbit, resulting then in a smaller Hilbert space. In
the example of the previous paragraph it may be relevant to consider one Hilbert space for
each subsystem. The large Hilbert space is however the correct space to use when the whole
system is considered.
Connected to a general physical system, one may have many e-variables θ and corresponding
operators A. In the ordinary quantum formalism, there is well-known theorem saying that,
in my formulation, θ1, ..., θn are compatible, that is, there exists an e-variable λ such that
θ
i = ti(λ) for some functions ti if and only if the corresponding operators commute:
[Ai, Aj] ≡ Ai Aj − Aj Ai = 0 for all i, j.
(See Holevo [4].) Compatible e-variables may in principle be estimated simultaneously with
arbitrary accuracy.
The way I have defined pure state, the only state vectors that are allowed, are those which
are eigenvectors of some physically meaningful operator. This is hardly a limitation in the
spin/angular momentum case where operators corresponding to all directions are included.
Nevertheless it is an open question to find general conditions under which all unit vectors in
H correspond to states |a; k〉 the way I have defined them. It is shown in [5] that this holds
under no further conditions for the spin 1/2 case.
7. Link to statistical inference
Assume now the symmetrical epistemic setting. We can think of a spin component in a
fixed direction to be assessed. To assume a state |a; k〉 is to assume perfect knowledge of the
e-variable θa: θa = uak . Such perfect knowledge is rarely available. In practice we have data z
a
about the system, and use these data to obtain knowledge about θa. Let us start with Bayesian
inference. This assumes prior probabilities piak on the values u
a
k , and after the inference we
have posterior probabilities piak(z
a). In either case we summarize this information in the
density operator:
σ
a = ∑
k
pi
a
k |a; k〉〈a; k|.
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Interpretation of the density operator σa:
1) We have posed the question ’What is the value of θa?’ 2) We have specified a prior or posterior
probability distribution piak over the possible answers. The probability for all possible answers to the
question, formulated in terms of state vectors, can be recovered from the density operator.
A third possibility for the probability specifications is a relatively new, but important concept
of a confidence distribution ([6], [7]). This is a frequentist alternative to the distribution
connected to a parameter (here: e-variable). The idea is that one looks at a one-sided
confidence interval for any value of the confidence coefficient γ. Let the data be z, and
let (−∞, β(γ, z)] be such an interval. Then β(γ) = β(γ, z) is an increasing function. We
define H(·) = β−1(·) as the confidence distribution for θ. This H is a cumulative distribution
function, and in the continuous case it is characterized with the property that H(β(γ, z))
has a uniform distribution over [0, 1] under the model. For discrete θa the confidence
distribution function Ha is connected to a discrete distribution, which gives the probabilities
piak . Extending the argument in [7] to this situation, this should not be looked upon as a
distribution of θa, but a distribution for θa, to be used in the epistemic process.
Since the sum of the probabilities is 1, the trace (sum of eigenvalues) of any density operator
is 1. In the quantum mechanical literature, a density operator is any positive operator with
trace 1.
Note that specification of the accessible e-variables θa is equivalent to specifying t(θa) for
any one-to-one function t. The operator t(Aa) has then distinct eigenvalues if and only if the
operator Aa has distinct eigenvalues. Hence it is enough in order to specify the question 1)
to give the set of orthonormal vectors |a; k〉.
Given the question a, the e-variable θa plays the role similar to a parameter in statistical
inference, even though it may be connected to a single unit. Inference can be done by
preparing many independent units in the same state. Inference is then from data za, a
part of the total data z that nature can provide us with. All inference theory that one finds
in standard texts like [8] applies. In particular, the concepts of unbiasedness, equivariance,
minimaxity and admissibility apply. None of these concepts are much discussed in the
physical literature, first because measurements there are often considered as perfect, at least
in elementary texts, secondly because, when measurements are considered in the physical
literature, they are discussed in terms of the more abstract concept of an operator-valued
measure; see below.
Whatever kind of inference we make on θa, we can take as a point of departure the statistical
model and the likelihood principle of Section 2. Hence after an experiment is done, and given
some context τ, all evidence on θa is contained in the likelihood p(za|τ, θa), where za is the
portion of the data relevant for inference on θa, also assumed discrete. This is summarized
in the likelihood effect:
E(za, τ) = ∑
k
p(za|τ, θa = uak)|a; k〉〈a; k|.
Interpretation of the likelihood effect E(za, τ):
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1) We have posed some inference question on the accessible e-variable θa. 2) We have specified the
relevant likelihood for the data. The likelihood for all possible answers of the question, formulated in
terms of state vectors, can be recovered from the likelihood effect.
Since the focused question assumes discrete data, each likelihood is in the range 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
In the quantum mechanical literature, an effect is any operator with eigenvalues in the range
[0, 1].
Return now to the likelihood principle of Section 2. The following principle follows.
The focused likelihood principle (FLP)
Consider two potential experiments in the symmetrical epistemic setting with equivalent contexts τ,
and assume that the inaccessible conceptual variable φ is the same in both experiments. Suppose
that the observations z∗1 and z
∗
2 have proportional likelihood effects in the two experiments, with a
constant of proportionality independent of the conceptual variable. Then the questions posed in the
two experiments are equivalent, that is, there is an e-variable θa which can be considered to be the same
in the two experiments, and the two observations produce the same evidence on θa in this context.
In many examples the two observations will have equal, not only proportional, likelihood
effects. Then the FLP says simply that the experimental evidence is a function of the
likelihood effect.
In the FLP we have the freedom to redefine the e-variable in the case of coinciding
eigenvalues in the likelihood effect, that is, if p(za|τ, θa = uk) = p(z
a|τ, θa = ul) for some k,
l. An extreme case is the likelihood effect E(za, τ) = I, where all the likelihoods are 1, that is,
the probability of z is 1 under any considered model. Then any accessible e-variable θa will
serve our purpose.
We are now ready to define the operator-valued measure in this discrete case:
Ma(B|τ) = ∑
za∈B
E(za, τ)
for any Borel set in the sample space for experiment a. Its usefulness will be seen after we
have discussed Born’s formula. Then we will also have background for reading much of [9],
a survey over quantum statistical inference.
8. Rationality and experimental evidence
Throughout this section I will consider a fixed context τ and a fixed epistemic setting in this
context. The inaccessible e-variable is φ, and I assume that the accessible e-variables θa take
a discrete set of values. Let the data behind the potential experiment be za, also assumed to
take a discrete set of values.
Let first a single experimentalist A be in this situation, and let all conceptual variables be
attached to A, although he also has the possibility to receiving information from others
through part of the context τ. He has the choice of doing different experiments a, and he
also has the choice of choosing different models for his experiment through his likelihood
pA(z
a|τ, θa). The experiment and the model, hence the likelihood, should be chosen before
the data are obtained. All these choices are summarized in the likelihood effect E, a function
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of the at present unknown data za. For use after the experiment, he should also choose
a good estimator/predictor θ̂a, and he may also have to choose some loss function, but the
principles behind these latter choices will be considered as part of the context τ. If he chooses
to do a Bayesian analysis, the estimator should be based on a prior pi(θa|τ). We assume that
A is trying to be as rational as possible in all his choices, and that this rationality is connected
to his loss function or to other criteria.
What should be meant by experimental evidence, and how should it be measured? As a
natural choice, let the experimental evidence that we are seeking, be the marginal probability
of the obtained data for a fixed experiment and for a given likelihood function. From the
experimentalist A’s point of view this is given by:
paA(z
a|τ) = ∑
k
pA(z
a|τ, θa = uk)piA(θ
a = uk|τ),
assuming the likelihood chosen by A and A’s prior piA for θ
a. In a non-Bayesian analysis,
we can let paA(z
a|τ) be the probability given the true value u0k of the e-variable: p
a
A(z
a|τ) =
pA(z
a|τ, θa = u0k). In general, take p
a
A(z
a|τ) as the probability of the part of the data za
which A assesses in connection to his inference on θa. By the FLP - specialized to the case of
one experiment and equal likelihoods - this experimental evidence must be a function of the
likelihood effect: paA(z
a|τ) = qA(E(z
a)|τ).
We have to make precise in some way what is meant by the rationality of the experimentalist
A. He has to make many difficult choices on the basis of uncertain knowledge. His actions
can partly be based on intuition, partly on experience from similar situations, partly on a
common scientific culture and partly on advices from other persons. These other persons
will in turn have their intuition, their experience and their scientific education. Often A will
have certain explicitly formulated principles on which to base his decisions, but sometimes
he has to dispense with the principles. In the latter case, he has to rely on some ’inner voice’,
a conviction which tells him what to do.
We will formalize all this by introducing a perfectly rational superior actor D, to which all
these principles, experiences and convictions can be related. We also assume that D can
observe everything that is going on, in particular A, and that he on this background can
have some influence on A’s decisions. The real experimental evidence will then be defined
as the probability of the data za from D’s point of view, which we assume also to give the real objective
probabilities. By the FLP this must again be a function of the likelihood effect E, where the
likelihood now may be seen as the objectively correct model.
pa(za|τ) = q(E(za)|τ) (4)
As said, we assume that D is perfectly rational. This can be formalized mathematically by
considering a hypothetical betting situation for D against a bookie, nature N. A similar
discussion was recently done in [10] using a more abstract language. Note the difference
to the ordinary Bayesian assumption, where A himself is assumed to be perfectly rational.
This difference is crucial to me. I do not see any human scientist, including myself, as being
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perfectly rational. We can try to be as rational as possible, but we have to rely on some
underlying rational principles that partly determine our actions.
So let the hypothetical odds of a given bet for D be (1− q)/q to 1, where q is the probability
as defined by (4). This odds specification is a way to make precise that, given the context
τ and given the question a, the bettor’s probability that the experimental result takes some
value is given by q: For a given utility measured by x, the bettor D pays in an amount qx -
the stake - to the bookie. After the experiment the bookie pays out an amount x - the payoff
- to the bettor if the result of the experiment takes the value za, otherwise nothing is payed.
The rationality of D is formulated in terms of
The Dutch book principle.
No choice of payoffs in a series of bets shall lead to a sure loss for the bettor.
For a related use of the same principle, see [11].
Assumption D.
Consider in some context τ a maximal symmetrical epistemic setting where the FLP is satisfied, and
the whole situation is observed and acted upon by a superior actor D as described above. Assume that
D’s probabilities q given by (4) are taken as the experimental evidence, and that D acts rationally in
agreement with the Dutch book principle.
A situation where all the Assumption D holds together with the assumptions of a symmetric
epistemic setting will be called a rational epistemic setting.
Theorem 6.
Assume a rational epistemic setting. Let E1 and E2 be two likelihood effects in this setting, and assume
that E1 + E2 also is a likelihood effect. Then the experimental evidences, taken as the probabilities of
the corresponding data, satisfy
q(E1 + E2|τ) = q(E1|τ) + q(E2|τ).
Proof. The result of the theorem is obvious, without making Assumption D, if E1 and E2
are likelihood effects connected to experiments on the same e-variable θa. We will prove
it in general. Consider then any finite number of potential experiments including the two
with likelihood effects E1 and E2. Let q1 = q(E1|τ) be equal to (4) for the first experiment,
and let q2 = q(E2|τ) be equal to the same quantity for the second experiment. Consider in
addition the following randomized experiment: Throw an unbiased coin. If head, choose
the experiment with likelihood effect E1; if tail, choose the experiment with likelihood effect
E2. This is a valid experiment. The likelihood effect when the coin shows head is
1
2E1,
when it shows tail 12E2, so that the likelihood effect of this experiment is E0 =
1
2 (E1 + E2).
Define q0 = q(E0). Let the bettor bet on the results of all these 3 experiments: Payoff x1 for
experiment 1, payoff x2 for experiment 2 and payoff x0 for experiment 0.
I will divide into 3 possible outcomes: Either the likelihood effect from the data z is E1 or it
is E2 or it is none of these. The randomization in the choice of E0 is considered separately
from the result of the bet. (Technically this can be done by repeating the whole series of
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experiments many times with the same randomization. This is also consistent with the
conditionality principle.) Thus if E1 occurs, the payoff for experiment 0 is replaced by the
expected payoff x0/2, similarly if E2 occurs. The net expected amount the bettor receives is
then
x1 +
1
2
x0 − q1x1 − q2x2 − q0x0 = (1− q1)x1 − q2x2 − (1− 2q0)
1
2
x0 if E1,
x2 +
1
2
x0 − q1x1 − q2x2 − q0x0 = −q1x1 − (1− q2)x2 − (1− 2q0)
1
2
x0 if E2,
−q1x1 − q2x2 − 2q0 ·
1
2
x0 otherwise.
The payoffs (x1, x2, x0) can be chosen by nature N in such a way that it leads to sure loss for
the bettor D if not the determinant of this system is zero:
0 =
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
1− q1 −q2 1− 2q0
−q1 1− q2 1− 2q0
−q1 −q2 −2q0
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
= q1 + q2 − 2q0.
Thus we must have
q(
1
2
(E1 + E2)|τ) =
1
2
(q(E1|τ) + q(E2|τ)).
If E1 + E2 is an effect, the common factor
1
2 can be removed by changing the likelihoods, and
the result follows.
Corollary.
Assume a rational epistemic setting. Let E1, E2, ... be likelihood effects in this setting, and assume
that E1 + E2 + ... also is a likelihood effect. Then
q(E1 + E2 + ...|τ) = q(E1|τ) + q(E2|τ) + ....
Proof. The finite case follows immediately from Theorem 6. Then the infinite case follows
from monotone convergence.
The result of this section is quite general. In particular the loss function and any other
criterion for the success of the experiments are arbitrary. So far I have assumed that the
choice of experiment a is fixed, which implies that it is the same for A and for D. However,
the result also applies to the following more general situation: Let A have some definite
purpose of his experiment, and to achieve that purpose, he has to choose the question a in a
clever manner, as rationally as he can. Assume that this rationality is formalized through the
actor D, who has the ideal likelihood effect E and the experimental evidence p(z|τ) = q(E|τ).
If two such questions shall be chosen, the result of Theorem 6 holds, with essentially the same
proof.
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9. The Born formula
9.1. The basic formula
Born’s formula is the basis for all probability calculations in quantum mechanics. In
textbooks it is usually stated as a separate axiom, but it has also been argued for by using
various sets of assumptions; see [12] for some references. Here I will base the discussion
upon the result of Section 8.
I begin with a recent result by Busch [13], giving a new version of a classical mathematical
theorem by Gleason. Busch’s version has the advantage that it is valid for a Hilbert space of
dimension 2, which Gleason’s original theorem is not, and it also has a simpler proof. For a
proof for the finite-dimensional case, see Appendix 5 of [2].
Let in general H be any Hilbert space. Recall that an effect E is any operator on the Hilbert
space with eigenvalues in the range [0, 1]. A generalized probability measure µ is a function
on the effects with the properties
(1) 0 ≤ µ(E) ≤ 1 for all E,
(2) µ(I) = 1,
(3) µ(E1 + E2 + ...) = µ(E1) + µ(E2) + ... whenever E1 + E2 + ... ≤ I.
Theorem 7. (Busch, 2003).
Any generalized probability measure µ is of the form µ(E) = Tr(σE) for some density operator σ.
It is now easy to see that q(E|τ) = p(z|τ) on the ideal likelihood effects of Section 8 is a
generalized probability measure if Assumption D holds: (1) follows since q is a probability;
(2) since E = I implies that the likelihood is 1 for all values of the e-variable, hence p(z) = 1;
finally (3) is a concequence of the corollary of Theorem 6. Hence there is a density operator
σ = σ(τ) such that p(z|τ) = Tr(σ(τ)E) for all ideal likelihood effects E = E(z).
Define now a perfect experiment as one where the measurement uncertainty can be
disregarded. The quantum mechanical literature operates very much with perfect
experiments which give well-defined states |k〉. From the point of view of statistics, if, say the
99% confidence or credibility region of θb is the single point ubk , we can infer approximately
that a perfect experiment has given the result θb = ubk .
In our symmetric epistemic setting then: We have asked the question: ’What is the value
of the accessible e-variable θb?’, and are interested in finding the probability of the answer
θb = ubj though a perfect experiment. This is the probability of the state |b; j〉. Assume now
that this probability is sought in a context τ = τa,k defined as follows: We have previous
knowledge of the answer θa = uak of another accessible question: What is the value of θ
a?
That is, we know the state |a; k〉. If θa is maximally accessible, this is the maximal knowledge
about the system that τ may contain; in general we assume that the context τ does not contain
more information about this system. It can contain irrelevant information, however.
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Theorem 8. (Born’s formula)
Assume a rational epistemic setting. In the above situation we have:
P(θb = ubj |θ
a = uak) = |〈a; k|b; j〉|
2.
Proof. Fix j and k, let |v〉 be either |a; k〉 or |b; j〉, and consider likelihood effects of
the form E = |v〉〈v|. This corresponds in both cases to a perfect measurement of
a maximally accessible parameter with a definite result. By Theorem 7 there exists a
density operator σa,k = ∑i pii(τ
a,k)|i〉〈i| such that q(E|τa,k) = 〈v|σa,k|v〉, where pii(τ
a,k) are
non-negative constants adding to 1. Consider first |v〉 = |a; k〉. For this case one must have
∑i pii(τ
a,k)|〈i|a; k〉|2 = 1 and thus ∑i pii(τ
a,k)(1− |〈i|a; k〉|2) = 0. This implies for each i that
either pii(τ
a,k) = 0 or |〈i|a; k〉| = 1. Since the last condition implies |i〉 = |a; k〉 (modulus an
irrelevant phase factor), and this is a condition which can only be true for one i, it follows
that pii(τ
a,k) = 0 for all other i than this one, and that pii(τ
a,k) = 1 for this particular i.
Summarizing this, we get σa,k = |a; k〉〈a; k|, and setting |v〉 = |b; j〉, Born’s formula follows,
since q(E|τa,k) in this case is equal to the probability of the perfect result θb = ubj .
9.2. Consequences
Here are three easy consequences of Born’s formula:
(1) If the context of the system is given by the state |a; k〉, and Ab is the operator corresponding
to the e-variable θb, then the expected value of a perfect measurement of θb is 〈a; k|Ab|a; k〉.
(2) If the context is given by a density operator σ, and A is the operator corresponding to the
e-variable θ, then the expected value of a perfect measurement of θ is Tr(σA).
(3) In the same situation the expected value of a perfect measurement of f (θ) is Tr(σ f (A)).
Proof of (1):
E(θb|θa = uak) = ∑
i
ubi P(θ
b = ubi |θ
a = uak)
= ∑
i
ubi 〈a; k|b; i〉〈b; i|a; k〉 = 〈a; k|A
b|a; k〉.
These results give an extended interpretation of the operator A compared to what I gave in
Section 5: There is a simple formula for all expectations in terms of the operator. On the other
hand, the set of such expectations determine the state of the system. Also on the other hand:
If A is specialized to an indicator function, we get back Born’s formula, so the consequences
are equivalent to this formula.
As an application of Born’s formula, we give the transition probabilities for electron spin. I
will, for a given direction a, define the e-variable θa as +1 if the measured spin component by
a perfect measurement for the electron is +h¯/2 in this direction, θa = −1 if the component is
−h¯/2. Assume that a and b are two directions in which the spin component can be measured.
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Proposition 2.
For electron spin we have
P(θb = ±1|θa = +1) = 1
2
(1± cos(a · b)).
This is proved in several textbooks, for instance [4], from Born’s formula. A similar proof
using the Pauli spin matrices is also given in [5].
Finally, using Born’s formula, we deduce the basic formula for quantum measurement. Let
the state of a system be given by a density matrix ρ = ρ(η), where η is an unknown statistical
parameter, and let the measurements be determined by an operator-valued measure M(·) as
defined in Section 7. Then the probability distribution of the observations is given by
P(B; η) = Tr(ρ(η)M(B)).
This, together with an assumption on the state after measurement, is the basis for [9].
10. Entanglement, EPR and the Bell theorem
The total spin components in different directions for a system of two spin 1/2 particles
satisfy the assumptions of a maximal symmetric epistemic setting. Assume that we have
such a system where j = 0, that is, the state is such that the total spin is zero. By ordinary
quantum mechanical calculations, this state can be explicitly written as
|0〉 = 1√
2
(|1,+〉 ⊗ |2,−〉 − |1,−〉 ⊗ |2,+〉), (5)
where |1,+〉 ⊗ |2,−〉 is a state where particle 1 has a spin component +h¯/2 and particle 2
has a spin component −h¯/2 along the z-axis, and vice versa for |1,−〉⊗ |2,+〉. This is what is
called an entangled state, that is, a state which is not a direct product of the component state
vectors. I will follow my own programme, however, and stick to the e-variable description.
Assume further that the two particles separate, the spin component of particle 1 is measured
in some direction by an observer Alice, and the spin component of particle 2 is measured by
an observer Bob. Before the experiment, the two observers agree both either to measure spin
in some fixed direction a or in another fixed direction b, orthogonal to a, both measurements
assumed for simplicity to be perfect. As a final assumption, let the positions of the two
observers at the time of measurement be spacelike, that is, the distance between them is so
large that no signal can reach from one to the other at this time, taking into account that
signals cannot go faster that the speed of light by the theory of relativity.
This is Bohm’s version of the situation behind the argument against the completeness of
quantum mechanics as posed by Einstein et al. [14] and countered by Bohr [15], [16]. This
discussion is still sometimes taken up today, although most physicists now support Bohr. So
will I, but I will go a step further. The main thesis in [14] was as follows: If, without in any
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way disturbing a system, we can predict the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element
of physical reality corresponding to this physical reality. Bohr answered by introducing a strict
interpretation of this criterion: To ascribe reality to P, the measurement of an observable whose
outcome allows for the prediction of P, must actually be performed, or one must give a description
of how it can be performed. Several authors have argued that Einstein’s criterion of reality
lead an assumption of non-locality: Signals between observers with a spacelike separation
must travel faster than light. Recently, it has been shown in [17] that the possibility is open
to interpret the non-locality theorems in the physical literature as arguments supporting the
strict criterion of reality, rather than a violation of locality. I agree with this last interpretation.
I will be very brief on this discussion here. Let λ be the spin component in units of h¯/2 as
measured by Alice, and let η be the spin component in the same units as measured by Bob.
Alice has a free choice between measuring in the the directions a and in the direction b. In
both cases, her probability is 1/2 for each of λ = ±1. If she measures λa = +1, say, she will
predict ηa = −1 for the corresponding component measured by Bob. According to Einstein
et al. [14] there should then be an element of reality corresponding to this prediction, but if
we adapt the strict interpretation of Bohr here, there is no way in which Alice can predict
Bob’s actual real measurement at this point of time. Bob on his side has also a free choice
of measurement direction a or b, and in both cases he has the probability 1/2 for each of
η = ±1. The variables λ and η are conceptual, the first one connected to Alice and the
second one connected to Bob. As long as the two are not able to communicate, there is no
sense in which we can make statements like η = −λ meaningful.
The situation changes. however, if Alice and Bob meet at some time after the measurement.
If Alice then says ’I chose to make a measurement in the direction a and got the result u’
and Bob happens to say ’I also chose to make a measurement in the direction a, and then
I got the result v’, then these two statements must be consistent: v = −u. This seems to
be a necessary requirement for the consistency of the theory. There is a subtle distinction
here. The clue is that the choices of measurement direction both for Alice and for Bob are
free and independent. The directions are either equal or different. If they should happen to
be different, there is no consistency requirement after the measurement, due to the assumed
orthogonality of a and b. Note again that we have an epistemic interpretation of quantum
mechanics. At the time of measurement, nothing exists except the observations by the two
observers.
Let us then look at the more complicated situation where a and b are not necessarily
orthogonal, where Alice tosses a coin and measures in the direction a if head and b if tail,
while Bob tosses an independent coin and measures in some direction c if head and in
another direction d if tail. Then there is an algebraic inequality
λaηc + λbηc + λbηd − λaηd ≤ 2. (6)
Since all the conceptual variables take values ±1, this inequality follows from
(λa + λb)ηc + (λb − λa)ηd = ±2 ≤ 2.
Now replace the conceptual variables here with actual measurements. Taking then formal
expectations from (6), assumes that the products here have meaning as random variables;
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in the physical literature this is stated as an assumption of realism and locality. This leads
formally to
E(λ̂aη̂c) + E(̂λbη̂c) + E(̂λb̂ηd)− E(λ̂âηd) ≤ 2 (7)
This is one of Bell’s inequalities, called the CHSH inequality.
On the other hand, using quantum-mechanical calculations, that is Born’s formula, from the
basic state (5), shows that a, b, c and d can be chosen such that Bell’s inequality (7) is violated.
This is also confirmed by numerous experiments with electrons and photons.
From our point of view the transition from (6) to (7) is not valid. One can not take the
expectation term by term in equation (6). The λ’s and η’s are conceptual variables belonging
to different observers. Any valid statistical expectation must take one of these observers
as a point of departure. Look at (6) from Alice’s point of view, for instance. She starts
by tossing a coin. The outcome of this toss leads to some e-variable λ being measured in
one of the directions a or b. This measurement is an epistemic process, and any prediction
based upon this measurement is a new epistemic process. During these processes she must
obey Conditionality principle 2 of Section 2. By this conditionality principle she should
condition upon the outcome of the coin toss. So in any prediction she should condition upon
the choice a or b. It is crucial for this argument that the prediction of an e-variable is an
epistemic process, not a process where ordinary probability calculations can be immediately
used.
By doing predictions from her measurement result, she can use Born’s formula. Suppose that
she measures λa and finds λa = +1, for instance. Then she can predict the value of λc and
hence ηc = −λc. Thus she can (given the outcome a of the coin toss) compute the expectation
of the first term (6). similarly, she can compute the expectation of the last term in (6). But
there is no way in which she simultaneously can predict λb and ηd. Hence the expectation
of the second term (and also, similarly the third term) in (6) is for her meaningless. A
similar conclusion is reached if the outcome of the coin toss gives b. And of course a similar
conclusion is valid if we take Bob’s point of view. Therefore the transition from (6) to (7) is
not valid, not by non-locality, but by a simple use of the conditionality principle. This can
also in some sense be called lack of realism: In this situation is it not meaningful to take
expectation from the point of view of an impartial observer. By necessity one must see the
situation from the point of view of one of the observers Alice or Bob.
Entanglement is very important in modern applications of quantum mechanics, not least
in quantum information theory, including quantum computation. It is also an important
ingredient in the theory of decoherence [18], which explains why ordinary quantum effects
are not usually visible on a larger scale. Decoherence theory shows the importance of the
entanglement of each system with its environment. In particular, it leads in effect to the
conclusion that all observers share common observations after decoherence between the
system and its environment, and this can then be identified with the ’objective’ aspects of the
world; which is also what the superior actor D of Section 8 would find.
11. Position as an e-variable and the Schrödinger equation
So far I have looked at e-variables taking a finite discrete set of values, but the concept of
an e-variable carries over to the continuous case. Consider the motion of a non-relativistic
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one-dimensional particle. Its position ξ at some time t can in principle be determined by
arbitrary accuracy, resulting in an arbitrarily short confidence interval. But momentum and
hence velocity cannot be determined simultaneously with arbitrary accuracy, hence the vector
(ξ(s), ξ(t)) for positions at two different time points is inaccessible. Now fix some time t. An
observer i may predict ξ(t) by conditioning on some σ-algebra Pi of information from the
past. This may be information from some time point si < t, but it can also take other forms.
We must think of different observers as hypothetical; only one of them can be realized.
Nevertheless one can imagine that all this information, subject to the choice of observer later,
is collected in an inaccessible σ-algebra Pt, the past of ξ(t). The distribution of ξ(t), given
the past Pt, for each t, can then be represented as a stochastic process.
In the simplest case one can then imagine {ξ(s); s ≥ 0} as an inaccessible Markov process:
The future is independent of the past, given the present. Under suitable regularity conditions,
a continuous Markov process will be a diffusion process, i.e., a solution of a stochastic
differential equation of the type
dξ(t) = b(ξ(t), t)dt + σ(ξ(t), t)dw(t). (8)
Here b(·, ·) and σ(·, ·) are continuous functions, also assumed differentiable, and {w(t); t ≥
0} is a Wiener process. The Wiener process is a stochastic process with continuous paths,
independent increments w(t) − w(s), w(0) = 0 and E((w(t) − w(s))2) = t − s. Many
properties of the Wiener process have been studied, including the fact that its paths are
nowhere differentiable. The stochastic differential equation (8) must therefore be defined in
a particular way; for an introduction to Itô calculus or Stochastic calculus; see for instance
[19].
So far we have considered observers making predictions of the present value ξ(t), given
the past Pt. There is another type of epistemic processes which can be described as follows:
Imagine an actor A which considers some future event for the particle, lying in a σ-algebra Fj.
He asks himself in which position he should place the particle at time t as well as possible
in order to have this event fulfilled. In other words, he can adjust ξ(t) for this purpose.
Again one can collect the σ-algebras for the different potential actors in one big inaccessible
σ-algebra Ft, the future after t. The conditioning of the present, given the future, defines
{ξ(t); t ≥ 0} as a new inaccessible stochastic process, with now t running backwards in time.
In the simplest case this is a Markov process, and can be described by a stochastic differential
equation
dξ(t) = b∗(ξ(t), t)dt + σ∗(ξ(t), t)dw∗(t), (9)
where again w∗(t) is a Wiener process.
Without having much previous knowledge about modern stochastic analysis and without
knowing anything about epistemic processes, Nelson [20] formulated his stochastic
mechanics, which serves our purpose perfectly. Nelson considered the multidimensional
case, but for simplicity, I will here only discuss a one-dimensional particle. Everything can
be generalized.
Nelson discussed what corresponds to the stochastic differential equations (8) and (9) with
σ and σ∗ constant in space and time. Since heavy particles fluctuate less than light particles,
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he assumed that these quantities vary inversely with mass m, that is, σ2 = σ2∗ = h¯/m. The
constant h¯ has dimension action, and turns out to be equal to Planck’s constant divided by
2pi. This assumes that σ2 = σ2∗ , a fact that Nelson actually proved in addition to proving that
b∗ = b− σ
2(lnρ)x,
where ρ = ρ(x, t) is the probability density of ξ(t).
Introduce u = (b − b∗)/2 and v = (b + b∗)/2. Then R =
1
2 lnρ(x, t) satisfies Rx = mu/h¯.
Let S be defined up to an additive constant by Sx = mv/h¯ and define the wave function
of the particle by f = exp(R + iS). Then | f (x, t)|2 = ρ(x, t) as it should. By defining the
acceleration of the particle in a proper way and using Newton’s second law, a set of partial
differential equations for u and v can be found, and by choosing the additive constant in S
properly, one deduces from these equations
ih¯
∂
∂t
f (x, t) = [
1
2m
(−ih¯
∂
∂x
)2 +V(x)] f (x, t), (10)
where V(x) is the potential energy. The details of these derivations can be found in [2] with
more details in [20]. Identifying −ih¯ ∂∂x as the operator for momentum, we see that (10) is the
Schrödinger equation for the particle.
12. Conclusion
Even though the mathematics here is more involved, the approach of the present chapter
(expressed in more detail in [2]) should serve to take some of the mystery off the ordinary
formal introduction to quantum theory. A challenge for the future will be to develop the
corresponding relativistic theory, by using representations of the Poincaré group together
with an argument like that in Section 11. Also, one should seek a link to elementary particle
physics using the relevant Lie group theory. Group theory is an important part of physics,
and it should come as no surprise that this also is relevant to the foundation of quantum
mechanics.
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